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a b s t r a c t
This paper uses microdata for 19 African countries to examine the gender difference in maths
test scores amongst primary school children. There is a signiﬁcant difference in maths test
scores in favour of boys, similar to that previously observed in developed countries. This
difference cannot be explained by gender differences in school quality, home environment, or
within-school gender discrimination in access to schooling inputs. However, the gender gap
varies widely with characteristics of the regions in which the pupils live, and these regional
characteristics are more predictive of the gender gap than parental education and school
characteristics, including teacher gender. At the cross-country level, differences in fertility
rates account for nearly half the variation in the gender gap, and this relationship is not due
to the correlation between fertility and GDP.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
There is widespread evidence of the existence of a fe-
male disadvantage in performance in mathematics tests in
high- and middle-income countries (e.g., Fryer & Levitt,
2010; Guiso, Monte, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008; Hedges
& Nowell, 1995). The causes underlying these differences
remain the subject of much debate. In the literature fo-
cussing on developing countries, an increasingly important
theme has been the study of female discrimination in hu-
man capital accumulation. However, few studies have inves-
tigated gender differences in test scores, and instead the fo-
cus has been on school enrolment and, to a lesser extent,
grade completion. Skills acquired matter more for individual∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 (0)117 92 89091.
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0272-7757/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access artlabour market outcomes and growth than mere attendance
(Hanushek & Woessman, 2008), and so evidence on the for-
mer is needed. Estimates of the impact of cognitive skills
on earnings are scarce outside developed countries. How-
ever, returns to cognitive skills are generally estimated to
be large, and where maths and reading skills are considered
separately, maths skills appear to matter more for income
(Glewwe, 1996; Jolliffe, 1998 for Ghana; Moll, 1998 for South
Africa), thus justifying our focus here on maths scores.
Two main types of arguments have been suggested to
explain the gender gap in mathematics test scores docu-
mented in developed countries. A ﬁrst potential explana-
tion is the biological one that boys are genetically more able
mathematically. In a recent critical review in which she re-
futes each claim in turn, Spelke (2005) summarises the three
most prominent genetic arguments: (i)male infants’ inherent
larger interest in objects versus people; (ii) gender-speciﬁc
proﬁles in spatial and numerical abilities leading to a greater
aptitude for mathematics; and (iii) higher dispersion of male
than female performance in quantitative and spatial ability,icle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1 For example, 2% of the male mean in PISA countries at age 15 (Guiso
et al., 2008), and 0.2 sd in the US in ﬁfth grade (Fryer and Levitt, 2010).so that larger numbers ofmenhave unusually high scores. For
example, Machin and Pekkarinen (2008) clearly show that
maths tests scores at age 15 aremore dispersed amongmales
than females in most OECD countries. Similarly, Ellison and
Swanson (2010) document the universal over-representation
of males in International Mathematical Olympiads, in which
participants are under 20 years old. However, neither ﬁnding
necessarily implies higher dispersion in intrinsic ability since
societal factors can inﬂuence these outcomes.
Lack of suitable data prevents us from casting direct light
on the importance of genetic factors. One way in which our
ﬁndings speak to the biological argument, however, is that
we ﬁnd that the size of the gender gap varies widely across
individualswith different characteristics, bothwithin andbe-
tween countries, and indeed becomes insigniﬁcant in some
strata of the population. Thus, any explanation based on bi-
ology would have to be able to account for these differences
i.e., by invoking an interaction of nature and nurture rather
than nature alone.
Instead, we focus on the second group of explanations
which have been suggested, namely cultural or societal ex-
planations for the gender gap. Here we test for two possibil-
ities. First, it could be that observable factors that inﬂuence
mathematics tests scores vary systematically across the gen-
ders, with boys having observable characteristics that lead to
higher test scores. It could, for instance, be the case that par-
ents send their sons to better schools than their daughters,
or that teachers discriminate against girls in the allocation
of schooling inputs. If girls indeed face poorer observable
schooling experiences than boys, then after controlling for
such characteristics, the gender gap should disappear. The
second possibility is that, although girls do not have observ-
able characteristics that are less conducive to performing
well in maths tests than boys, family, school and societal
inﬂuences affect boys and girls differently in ways that we
do not directly observe. For instance, some of these inﬂu-
ences could result in genuine or perceived gender-speciﬁc re-
turns tomaths skills or in stereotype threats (i.e. “situation[s]
where one faces judgement on societal stereotypes about
one’s group” (Spencer et al., 1999, p.5)), that are not captured
by our individual regressors. We investigate this second pos-
sibility by studying the interaction between female gender
and various indicators of societal inﬂuences measured at the
household-, school-, and (sub-national) region level, to de-
termine whether the size of the gender gap varies with such
inﬂuences.
We use data from two surveys of primary school pupils in
Africa, namely the ‘Southern and Eastern African Consortium
for Monitoring Educational Quality’ (SACMEQ) and the ‘Pro-
gram for the Analysis of Education Systems’ (PASEC), which
together cover 19 countries and nearly 50,000 pupils in Sub-
Saharan Africa. We merge these data with relevant charac-
teristics of 139 sub-national regions in which the pupils live
based on microdata taken from available Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS).
We contribute to the maths gender gap literature in sev-
eral ways. First, we are the ﬁrst to document the ubiquity of a
gender gap inmathematics in Sub-Saharan African countries.
We ﬁnd that the size of the gap (0.1 standard deviations (sd)
or 4–5% of the male mean grade towards the end of primaryschool) is of the same order of magnitude as that observed
in developed countries.1 Second, we are able to rule out a
number of potential explanations for the existence of this
gap, including gender differences in school quality, within-
school discrimination in access to schooling inputs and lower
parental investments in female schooling conditional on en-
rolment. Third, we show that girls only perform substantially
less well than boys in maths in some societal environments,
and that characteristics of the societies children grow up in
aremorepredictive of the gender gap thanparental education
and school characteristics, including teacher gender. Fourth,
we show that, in Sub-Saharan Africa, differences in fertility
rates account for nearly half the cross-country variation in the
gender gap, and this relationship is not due to the correlation
between fertility and GDP per capita or between fertility and
gender (in)equality in the labourmarket and political sphere.
Our ﬁndings therefore suggest that a gender gap in maths
performance is observed in Africa too, but that it is not due
simply to inherent, genetic differences between genders per
se; speciﬁc environmental factors are required in order for
any genetic difference to translate into substantially lower
average female performance in maths.
Given the non-experimental nature of the data, we do
not give a causal interpretation to the estimated effect of the
variables entering the standardised maths score production
function. Instead, we aim to shed light on the broad nature
of the gender gap by answering the following questions: Can
the gap be accounted for by differences in school quality,
within-school discrimination in access to schooling inputs,
differences in parental socio-economic status, or differential
investments in schooling, such as help with maths school
work and child labour? Under what circumstances does the
gap arise? To what extent can biology account for the ob-
served gap(s)? Are the same societal explanations valid uni-
formly across developed and developing countries?
Given the lower enrolment rates of girls compared to boys
in developing countries, and especially so in Sub-Saharan
Africa, we expect the girls we observe in our in-school sam-
ples tobemorepositively selected than theboys (Glick, 2008).
We are not aware of a survey of African children that ap-
plied an internationally comparable test to all, irrespective of
school enrolment status. By controlling for a wide range of
observable characteristics, we expect to reduce much of the
differential selection into enrolment between boys and girls.
The remaining selection bias should work against ﬁnding a
female disadvantage and so our estimates should be seen as
lower bounds of the true gender gap inmaths in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Similarly, any selection bias should work against ﬁnd-
ing a lower gender gap in the circumstances under which we
observe a lower gender gap.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
The next section summarises the most relevant literature.
Section 3 describes the data sources employed. Section 4 doc-
uments the gender gap in the raw data and motivates the
regression analysis, Section 5 presents the regression results
and discussion, and, ﬁnally, Section 6 concludes.
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Previous research by social scientists and economists has
explored potential explanations of the maths gender gap
based on societal factors. Typically, the approach taken has
been to test whether cross-country or cross-US state differ-
ences in gender differentials can be accounted for by differ-
ences in female status. In 39 middle- to high-income coun-
tries taking part in the 2003 Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA), Guiso et al. (2008) show that up
to a third of the cross-country variation in the female maths
gap can be accounted for by differences in GDP per capita and
in indicators of gender inequality as measured by the ‘Gen-
der Gap Index’ (GGI). The GGI comprises four sub-indexes:
(i) economic participation and opportunity as measured by
a weighted mean of 5 ratios, namely the ratio of female-to-
male: labour force participation; wages; earned income; leg-
islators, senior oﬃcials andmanagers; professional and tech-
nicalworkers; (ii) educational attainment asmeasured by the
weightedmean of four ratios: literacy rate; net enrolment in:
primary; secondary; and tertiary schooling; (iii) health and
survival calculated as the weighted mean of female-to-male
healthy life expectancy and female-to-male sex ratio at birth;
(iv) political empowerment computed as the weighted aver-
age of the women-to-men ratio of seats in parliament; min-
isters; and female-to-male years as head of state during the
last 50 years (seeHausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2007 for further
details). However, Fryer and Levitt (2010) show that the cor-
relation between the gender gap and the GGI index does not
hold in all the countries from the 2003 Trends in International
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS) evaluation exercise,
and point to a potential explanation based on the presence
of a few predominantly Muslim outliers characterised by the
dominance of single-sex schooling, and which exhibit both
high female performance in maths and low levels of female
empowerment.
The evidence considering the relationship between the
GGI index and cross-country variation in gender differences
outside the mean is equally mixed. Hyde and Mertz (2009)
ﬁnd a positive correlation between a country’s 2007 GGI
and the country’s female representation at the International
Mathematical Olympiad, but Ellison and Swanson (2010) do
not observe such correlationwhen considering a different cut
of the same data. Machin and Pekkarinen (2008) ﬁnd no cor-
relation between a country’s GGI index and the relative dis-
persion ofmale and femalemaths scores. In theUnited States,
Pope and Sydnor (2010) ﬁnd that 40% of the variation across
states in stereotypical gender differences in 8th-Grade test
scores are accounted for by differences in survey responses
to a question about gender roles.
In a similar approach to ours, Fryer and Levitt (2010) un-
dertake a number ofmicro-analyses to try to explain the gen-
der gap in theUS in theearly years of schooling, butultimately
can ﬁnd no explanation within their data set. Their results
suggest that the gap is not attributable to less investment in
maths by girls, nor by low parental expectations of girls in
maths, nor by testing mechanisms that are biased towards
girls. Interestingly, they also show that the gap is observed in
all strata of US society, contrary to what we ﬁnd for Africa.
Our paper is also related to that of Bedard and Cho (2010),
who use data from the Trends in International Mathematicsand Science Study (TIMSS) surveys to investigate the gender
gap in maths and science scores in OECD countries. Including
class ﬁxed effects in their estimated equations increases the
size of the gender gap in most of the countries they analyse,
suggesting that girls are, on average, placed in better per-
forming classes than boys. In trying to explain the difference
in the size of the gender gap across countries, Bedard and Cho
(2010) focus on the issue of streaming, and ﬁnd that themore
exclusive the academic stream, and the earlier the streaming
takes place, the larger is the gender gap in maths and science
scores.
In this paper, we carry out micro-analyses in which we
(i) control for observable differences between boys and girls
and then (ii) interact characteristics of interest with female
gender. Our approach in the ﬁrst step of our analysis is sim-
ilar to that in Fryer and Levitt (2010), and rules out a num-
ber of observable pathways through which girls may obtain
lower scores than boys in the African context. The second
step of our analysis is related to the cross-country studies re-
viewedabove in thatwe testwhether thegender gap inmaths
varies with characteristics of the pupil’s environment. But
contrary to these studies, we explore interactions of gender
with parental, school and regional inﬂuences, while control-
ling for observable characteristics of the pupils. This allows
us to shed light on a range of correlates of the gender gap, as
well as compare the relative importance of different levels of
socialisation.
Given the difference in economic and cultural background
between Sub-Saharan Africa and countries covered by the
previous literature on maths gender gaps, some discussion
is warranted. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the main concern of re-
searchers and policy makers with respect to the education of
girls has been to ﬁnd ways to allow them to get one at all.
Even at primary schooling age, African enrolment rates have
been far from unity in many countries, and especially so for
girls. This has led to the United Nations setting as a Millen-
niumDevelopment Goal the elimination of gender inequality
in enrolment in primary and secondary education, and female
education enrolment rates have indeed been rising steadily,
so that the gross enrolment parity index (GER) (i.e., the ratio
of female-to-male gross enrolment) has reached 0.91 in Sub-
Saharan Africa in 2009 (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2011).
In the countries included in this study, this ratio varies from
0.64 to 1.08 (see Table A1).
Both demand-side and supply-side arguments have been
put forward to explain why girls have lower enrolment or
educational achievement in developing countries.We give an
overviewof these arguments and thendiscuss their relevance
to performance in tests, conditional on enrolment.
On the demand side, different schooling investments may
arise for boys and girls if costs, beneﬁts, or preferences are
gender-speciﬁc. Differences in direct costs should be mini-
mal in co-educational settings such as those found in most of
Sub-Saharan Africa, but may be important where single-sex
schooling is the norm. Opportunity costs are likely to vary
with gender in many developing countries, e.g., if a daugh-
ter is of greater use than a son in performing domestic and
caring duties around the home. Beneﬁts may be lower if girls
expect lower earnings in adulthood due to gender-biased op-
portunities in the labour market. Furthermore, there may
be gender-speciﬁc parental beneﬁts from a given level of
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3 Weuse version 6.0 of the SACMEQ II data (datedOctober 2009): see Ross,
Saito, Dolata, Ikeda, and Zuze (2004) for details. The countries are: Botswana,earnings if tradition dictates that only offspring of a certain
gender are expected to lookafter their parents in their old age.
Alternatively, cultural norms may lead to a gender-speciﬁc,
subjective valuation of educational attainment.
On the supply side, education provision may vary by gen-
der both in terms of quantity and quality. In the Sub-Saharan
African countries studied here, almost all schools are co-
educational, so that widespread differences in school quality
would only arise from the supply-side if girls were rationed
out of schools which in theory were open to both genders.2
However, gender differences in schooling quality can arise
within school. Colclough, Rose, and Tembon (2000), for in-
stance, relate case studies in Ethiopia and Guinea in which
girls were found to carry out more non-school activities dur-
ing school hours, such as cleaning the classroom, oﬃces and
latrines, and fetching water.
A large number of studies have estimated the role of
demand-side factors on gender differences in enrolment in
poor countries, and consistently found that the enrolment of
girls is generally more sensitive to changes in household in-
come and schooling costs than that of boys. Glick and Sahn
(2000) for Guinea; Björkman (2006) for Uganda; and Sackey
(2007) for Ghana all ﬁnd that girls’ enrolment ismore respon-
sive to changes in household income than that of boys. Con-
ditional transfers also tend to have larger enrolment effects
for girls in contexts in which they start with lower enrol-
ment (Glick, 2008). Fewer studies have considered the role of
supply-side factors, but the review in Glick (2008) highlights
the observation that female enrolment – and sometimes test
scores (as in Chin, 2005) – appears to be more responsive to
improvements in school quality, although it is not clear why
this is the case.
How can these potential explanations for gender gaps in
enrolment in developing countries translate into differences
in test scores conditional on enrolment? Demand-side in-
ﬂuences could result in differences in attendance or in in-
vestment in education both in terms of effort and in ﬁnancial
terms, bypupils and/orparents. For example,AslamandKing-
don (2008) ﬁnd evidence of lower educational expenditures
for sons than daughters in Pakistan conditional on enrolment
in middle- and secondary-school ages, but not at primary
schooling ages. Supply-side factors could lead to systemati-
cally poorer access to schooling inputswithin-school.We test
for each of these possibilities in our data.
As gender gaps in school enrolment decrease, it becomes
particularly important to consider inequality in the acquisi-
tion of cognitive skills during the time spent at school. The
literature explicitly considering gender differences in test
scores in developing countries is sporadic. Appleton (1995)
studies gender differences in pass rates in the examination
at the end of primary schooling in Côte d’Ivoire and shows
that the female pass rate is lower and much more sensitive
to household expenditure than that of boys. At very high
levels of household consumption, girls actually outperform
boys. Alderman, Behrman, Ross, and Sabot (1996) explore
correlates of the gender gap in cognitive skills amongst indi-
viduals aged 10–25 in Pakistan. They ﬁnd that the dominant2 Systematic gender differences in school quality could also arise from the
demand side, if parents sent their sons to better schools than their daughters.explanation lies in differences in the demand, by parents,
for primary education between the genders. Behrman and
Knowles (1999) ﬁnd that the exam score obtained in the last
completed grade of schooling is more elastic to parental in-
come for girls compared to boys in Vietnam. Chin (2005)
ﬁnds that an exogenous increase in the number of teachers
in schools in India increased female, but not male, enrolment
and test scores. The recent randomized controlled experi-
ment literature in developing countries has been successful
in identifying interventions which are particularly beneﬁcial
to female enrolment, but has less to say about interventions
which improve female relative performance at school tests.
For example, the interventions analysed in Kazianga, Levy,
Linden, and Sloan (2012), and Burde and Linden (2012) both
led to large improvements in the enrolment of girls relative
to boys, but they did not improve relative female test scores
for those in school. However, exploiting a randomized nat-
ural experiment in West Bengal, Beaman, Duﬂo, Pande, and
Topalova (2012) ﬁnd that the gender gap in aspirations and
educational outcomes decreases in villageswhere seats at the
local council have been randomly reserved for women, thus
suggesting a role for socialisation in shaping gender differ-
ences in educational attainment.
3. Data
Our education data come from two pan-African surveys
of educational quality, the Southern and Eastern African Con-
sortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ), and
the Program for the Analysis of Education Systems (PASEC)
which, taken together, cover 19Western, Southern and East-
ern African nations. We merge these microdata with (sub-
national) region indicators which we construct based on De-
mographic and Health Surveys, where they are available.
3.1. SACMEQ
SACMEQ is a consortium of 15 Ministries of Education in
Southern and Eastern Africa. We utilise data from the second
survey (SACMEQ II) which gathered data from 14 countries in
Southern and Eastern Africa between 2000 and 2002.3 For the
12 countries considered in this study, almost 38,000 pupils
were surveyed in over 5000 classes spread between 2125
schools.
In addition to testing the numeracy and literacy skills
of Standard Grade 6 pupils, the survey collected data from
pupils, teachers and the school headteacher. The mathemat-
ics test was based partly on TIMMS items and partly on other
items newly written by the SACMEQ National Research Co-
ordinators. The same questionnaire and tests were adminis-
tered across all countries. Most of the data used here come
from the pupil questionnaire, since we focus on the gen-
der gap within-school. We also use information on teachers’Kenya, Lesotho,Malawi,Mauritius,Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania (Mainland), Uganda, Zambia and Zanzibar. We
exclude Zanzibar to focus onMainland Tanzania only, and also the Seychelles
because of themuch higher standard of living there as compared to the other
countries under consideration.
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5 DHSsurveys arenot available for all countries inour sample. Therefore, in
the cross-country regressions, we use national TFR data from the US Censusgender and classroom equipment from the teacher question-
naire.
3.2. PASEC
PASEC is the evaluation tool used by CONFEMEN, a net-
work of Education Ministers from 41 Francophone countries.
The programme consists of a number of national surveys us-
ing a combination of headteacher, teacher, and pupil ques-
tionnaires, as well as uniﬁed maths and (French) literacy
tests. The questionnaires used cover the same themes as in
SACMEQ, albeit in less detail. They are adapted to each coun-
try by a national team (e.g., for some of the household items
which the pupils are asked to say whether they have in their
homes), but most questions are the same across countries.
PASEC test items are based on common aspects of the cur-
ricula across the PASEC countries. Compared to SACMEQ, the
PASEC surveys have the advantage of testing children who
are in Grade 2 as well as those in Grade 5 at the time of the
survey, and of administering two tests at each level, one at
the beginning of the year, and a different one at the end of
the year. This allows for an analysis of ‘value-added’. PASEC
surveys have been carried out since 1995, but data qual-
ity is only considered high for surveys from 2003 onwards
(see http://www.confemen.org/508/acces-aux-donnees-du-
pasec/). We therefore focus on these data. More speciﬁcally,
weusedata fromsevencountries surveyedbetween2003and
2006, leading to a sampleof 13,754 (14,413)Grade5 (Grade2)
pupils in 956 (985) schools and as many classes. Cronbach’s
alpha, which measures internal consistency across items and
therefore the extent to which the test items measure under-
lying ability, is high, varying between 0.76 and 0.87 across
the surveys used in this study.4
Both the SACMEQ and PASEC surveys have previously
been used in research estimating the effectiveness of in-
puts in primary education, in a hierarchicalmodel framework
(Fehrler, Michaelowa, &Wechtler, 2009; Michaelowa, 2001).
Contrary to these studies, however, we do not attach a causal
interpretation to the correlations between pupil, school, and
country characteristics, on the one hand, and test scores on
the other. Instead, we use these correlations to shed light on
gender differences in mathematics achievement.
Mathematics test results are comparable across countries
within PASEC, and across countries within SACMEQ, but are
not comparable between the two surveys. The mathematics
test scores used as the dependent variable in our analyses
are therefore standardised to have mean zero and a standard
deviation of one within each survey (SACMEQ or PASEC) and
the analysis is carried out separately for each survey.
3.3. Demographic and health surveys
In order to examine the variation in the gender gap across
areas characterised by different levels of development and
different cultural values, we construct regional indicators
based on data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).4 PASEC country reports (http://www.confemen.org/le-pasec/rapports-
et-documents-pasec/les-rapports-du-pasec/) and personal communications
with CONFEMEN technical advisors. The seven countries in question are:
Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, and Mauritania.DHS surveys are national surveys of households, and women
and men of reproductive age, which are carried out in many
developing countries, including most of Africa. The main aim
of these surveys is to provide internationally comparable, re-
liable data on fertility and maternal and child health where
administrative data is lacking. Samples are designed to allow
analysis at the regional level, and so we use these surveys,
where available, to construct regional variables based on the
individual responses. In particular, we calculate regional total
fertility rates (TFR,which is deﬁned as the number of children
a woman would have by age 50 if she were subject to the
age-speciﬁc fertility rate currently observed in the popula-
tion) based on fertility histories for the 5 years preceding the
survey, regional shares of womenwho deﬁned themselves as
Muslim, and the regional share of women who have no edu-
cation. These data are available in all DHS surveys, including
for Mauritania in 2003 (Isselmou, 2004), for which the DHS
microdata are not in the public domain. Unfortunately, the
DHS do not contain income or expenditure data.
Most countries can be matched with a DHS carried out
within 2 years of the country’s SACMEQ or PASEC survey (see
AppendixA, TableA4). Exceptions are:Mozambique (3years),
Lesotho (4 years), Gabon (5 years), and Swaziland (6 years).
The second (Mauritius) and third (Botswana) wealthiest
countries in our sample could not be matched as Mauritius
has no DHS and Botswana’s last DHS took place in 1988.
3.4. Other data sources
In the cross-country analysis, we use a number of sources
in order to obtain data on: GDP per capita (IMF World Eco-
nomicOutlookDatabase); national total fertility rate (USCen-
sus Bureau International Database)5; genetic distance, which
proxies for the “time elapsed since twopopulations’ last com-
mon ancestors” (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009); share Muslim
in the population (CIA Factbook, 2010a, except for Botswana
and Zambia, for which we use data in Kettani, 2009); mater-
nalmortality (CIA Factbook, 2010b); and the gross enrolment
rate in primary schools (UNESCO, 2006). See Table A4 for
more details.
4. Descriptive statistics
4.1. Average test scores and control variables, by gender
Tables 1a and 1b contain descriptive statistics on all the
variables used in the micro-analysis for the SACMEQ and
PASEC (Grade 5) samples respectively, and in both cases sep-
arately for girls and boys. The top of the tables show the num-
ber of girls and boys and their scores on themaths tests. Since
the tests are comparable only within survey, we standardise
the test scores by the survey-speciﬁc (i.e., SACMEQ or PASEC)
mean and standard deviation.6 In SACMEQ countries, boysBureau International Database rather than fertility rates based on DHS data.
6 It is interesting to note, however, that the percentage of correct answers
in the SACMEQ and PASEC (ﬁnal) tests are very similar, at around 40% on
average, with an only slightly higher dispersion of scores in the PASEC post-
test (18.43 [18.54] for girls [boys]) as compared to the SACMEQ test (15.23
[15.72] for girls [boys]).
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Table 1a
SACMEQ – descriptive statistics.
Variable Girl mean Boy mean Difference (girl–boy) (t-stat)
No. of children 18,302 18,860
Maths score – percent (standard error) 38.88 (15.23) 40.25 (15.72) −1.372∗∗∗ (−8.54)
Maths score – standardised (standard error) −0.046 (0.98) 0.043 (1.02) −0.089∗∗∗ (−8.54)
Age 13.06 13.65 −0.591∗∗∗ (−28.73)
Individual pupil access to schooling inputs
=1 if no maths text books 0.116 0.117 −0.001 (−0.27)
=1 if has own math text book 0.485 0.479 0.006 (1.20)
=1 if no maths homework 0.048 0.055 −0.007∗∗∗ (−2.94)
=1 if teacher corrects maths some times 0.221 0.220 0.001 (0.16)
=1 if teacher corrects maths most times 0.206 0.207 −0.001 (−0.33)
=1 if teacher corrects maths always 0.492 0.478 0.014∗∗∗ (2.70)
Pupil equipment index 5.569 5.469 0.100∗∗∗ (5.15)
=1 if write on chair/bench 0.941 0.923 0.018∗∗∗ (6.81)
=1 if write on desk/table 0.913 0.896 0.018∗∗∗ (5.83)
=1 if can borrow library books 0.452 0.456 −0.003 (−0.64)
School/classroom characteristics
=1 if single-sex school 0.005 0.012 −0.006∗∗∗ (−6.61)
=1 if public school 0.895 0.909 −0.014∗∗∗ (−4.39)
=1 if female teacher 0.440 0.399 0.041∗∗∗ (7.85)
Class equipment index 5.221 5.101 0.120∗∗∗ (5.69)
Home environment
=1 if middle wealth tercile 0.340 0.327 0.013∗∗∗ (2.69)
=1 if top wealth tercile 0.339 0.327 0.012∗∗ (2.42)
=1 if stay with relatives during week 0.119 0.113 0.006∗ (1.68)
=1 if stay boarding school during week 0.044 0.052 −0.008∗∗∗ (−3.72)
=1 if stay on own during week 0.026 0.031 −0.005∗∗∗ (−3.06)
Number of meals everyday 2.379 2.344 0.035∗∗∗ (3.87)
=1 if someone does math with you some times 0.551 0.545 0.005 (1.05)
=1 if someone does math with you most times 0.255 0.243 0.012∗∗∗ (2.73)
=1 if questions about maths some times 0.549 0.549 0.000 (0.02)
=1 if questions about maths most times 0.271 0.263 0.008∗ (1.70)
=1 if extra maths tuition 0.359 0.363 −0.004 (−0.83)
Number of books in home 24.97 22.96 2.008∗∗∗ (3.61)
Father education index 7.057 7.128 −0.072 (−1.30)
=1 if Father education index missing 0.239 0.205 0.033∗∗∗ (7.75)
Mother education index 7.174 6.791 0.384∗∗∗ (7.76)
=1 if Mother education index missing 0.160 0.155 0.005 (1.41)
=1 if gets no homework 0.011 0.012 −0.001 (−1.13)
=1 if check homework some times 0.469 0.489 −0.020∗∗∗ (−3.84)
=1 if check homework most times 0.418 0.381 0.037∗∗∗ (7.28)
=1 if help with homework some times 0.540 0.544 −0.004 (−0.71)
=1 if help with homework most times 0.295 0.262 0.033∗∗∗ (7.08)
=1 if check schoolwork sometimes 0.501 0.508 −0.007 (−1.37)
=1 if check schoolwork most times 0.350 0.328 0.022∗∗∗ (4.52)
Number days absent per month 1.511 1.759 −0.249∗∗∗ (−9.43)
=1 if absent for work reason 0.039 0.055 −0.016∗∗∗ (−7.23)
=1 if absent for family reason 0.085 0.089 −0.004 (−1.39)
=1 if absent for unpaid fees 0.044 0.044 0.000 (0.14)
Regional characteristics
Regional share of uneducated adult women 0.149 0.175 −0.026∗∗∗ (−16.16)
Regional total fertility rate (TFR) 4.748 4.916 −0.167∗∗∗ (−10.15)
Regional share Muslim 0.059 0.072 −0.013∗∗∗ (−7.89)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SACMEQ II data except for regional characteristics, which are calculated from DHS data, as described in Section 3.
Notes:
(1) Summary statistics based on the 37,162 children for whom all of the above variables are deﬁned (as in Table 4a, Column (5)).
(2) Base category for maths text book is ‘shares maths text book’; pupil equipment index ranges from 0 to 8 based on access to items such as exercise books,
pencils and rulers; class equipment index ranges from 0 to 8 based on whether the classroom is equipped with a writing board, chalk, wall chart, cupboard,
bookshelves, library, and a chair and table for the teacher.
(3)Wealth terciles are based onwithin-country PCA of ownership of a range of assets including housing and housing quality, household goods, and livestock;
number of books at home is a continuous variable based on the mid-points of a 5 level categorical scale; father/mother education index is the estimated
number of years of education completed based on the reported highest level of education attained and country-speciﬁc information on different education
systems.
∗ p < 0.10.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1b
PASEC – descriptive statistics.
Variable Girl mean Boy mean Difference (girl–boy) (t-stat)
No. of children 5139 6005
Maths pre-test score Grade 5 – percent (standard error) 44.52 (20.93) 46.57 (20.91) −2.052∗∗∗ (−5.16)
Maths pre-test score Grade 5 – standardised (standard error) −0.045 (1.00) 0.053 (1.00) −0.098∗∗∗ (−5.16)
Maths post-test score Grade 5 – percent (standard error) 38.37 (18.43) 38.98 (18.54) −0.609∗ (−1.73)
Maths post-test score Grade 5 – standardised (standard error) −0.021 (1.00) 0.012 (1.00) −0.033∗ (−1.73)
Age 11.92 12.09 −0.178∗∗∗ (−5.29)
Individual pupil access to schooling inputs
=1 if has maths book 0.474 0.470 0.005 (0.49)
=1 if teacher help with homework 0.031 0.030 0.000 (0.13)
School/classroom characteristics
=1 if single-sex school 0.020 0.017 0.003 (1.12)
=1 if public school 0.845 0.873 −0.028∗∗∗ (−4.17)
=1 if female teacher 0.312 0.263 0.049∗∗∗ (5.67)
Class equipment index 5.428 5.450 −0.021 (−0.49)
Home environment
=1 if middle wealth tercile 0.409 0.424 −0.015 (−1.59)
=1 if top wealth tercile 0.350 0.303 0.047∗∗∗ (5.31)
=1 if does not live with parents 0.133 0.121 0.012∗ (1.94)
=1 if single parent 0.235 0.241 −0.006 (−0.77)
Regular daily meals (0–3) 2.751 2.675 0.076∗∗∗ (6.57)
=1 if father is literate 0.779 0.688 0.092∗∗∗ (10.93)
=1 if mother is literate 0.598 0.494 0.104∗∗∗ (11.05)
=1 if parental help 0.278 0.236 0.042∗∗∗ (5.06)
=1 if sibling help 0.423 0.441 −0.017∗ (−1.85)
=1 if tutor help 0.043 0.037 0.007∗ (1.77)
=1 if other help 0.050 0.047 0.003 (0.71)
=1 if domestic work 0.912 0.750 0.162∗∗∗ (22.89)
=1 if works in agriculture or trade 0.580 0.647 −0.067∗∗∗ (−7.29)
=1 if work affects study at home 0.184 0.179 0.005 (0.72)
=1 if work affects school attendance 0.123 0.133 −0.010 (−1.64)
=1 if work affects schooling ‘cos too tired 0.124 0.133 −0.009 (−1.43)
Regional characteristics
Regional share of uneducated adult women 0.393 0.456 −0.062∗∗∗ (−10.79)
Regional total fertility rate (TFR) 5.500 5.703 −0.203∗∗∗ (−11.43)
Regional share Muslim 0.370 0.389 −0.019∗∗ (−2.45)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PASEC data except for regional characteristics, which are calculated from DHS data, as described in
Section 3.
Notes:
(1) Summary statistics based on the 11,144 children for whom all the above variables are deﬁned (including imputed values where there
are less than 15% missing values within school, as in Table 4b, Column (5)).
(2) Variables are imputed where an individual value is missing, but where the share of missing values within the school is less than 15%.
Continuous variables are replaced by the school mean, and categorical variables by the school mode. Where more than 15% of values are
missing within the school, values are not imputed.
(3) Wealth terciles are based on within-country PCA of ownership of a range of assets including housing and housing quality, household
goods, and livestock, except for Chad and Guinea. For these countries, the PASEC data ﬁles do not provide information on ownership of
individual items, but instead contain a country-speciﬁc wealth indicator based on ownership of these items, classifying households as poor,
middle, or rich, but these categories do not correspond to terciles.
∗ p < 0.10.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
7 We calculated the enrolment ratios (i.e. the number of girls/the number
of boys) in our PASEC and SACMEQ samples and compared these to the gen-
der parity index in primary education in the country published in UNESCO
(2006) – see Table A1. The coeﬃcient of correlation between the enrolment
ratio in our sample (taken in a single year towards the end of primary school-score 0.09 standard deviations (sd) higher, on average, than
girls. In the PASEC data, boys score more highly than girls
at both the beginning and the end of Grade 5, by 0.10 and
0.03 sd respectively. All of these differences are statistically
signiﬁcant.
The remaining rows in Tables 1a and 1b contain informa-
tion on the explanatory variables used in the analysis, and
show how they differ between girls and boys. The SACMEQ
data in Table 1a reveal that, on average, the boys in the sam-
ple are slightly, but statistically signiﬁcantly, older than the
girls. One plausible explanation for this difference is that girls
are more likely to come from higher socio-economic sta-
tus households in which children’s school enrolment suffers
fewer delays. Indeed, consistent with the lower enrolmentrates of girls compared to boys, the girls that we observe in
schools come from wealthier families, have more books at
home, have a higher average number of meals per day, have
better educated mothers, and are found in better-equipped
classrooms.7 Thus, the lower female performance in maths
observed in the raw data is likely to underestimate the true
extent of the gender gap, and should tend to increase as weing) and the enrolment ratios from this external source is 0.91.
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8 Note however that thenumber of childrenobserved in single-sex schools
is extremely small in the countries being studied. For this reason we do not
pursue the analysis of single-sex schools in our main results in Section 5.control for school ﬁxed-effects and family background char-
acteristics.
We also see that girls are more likely to be enrolled in
private schools and to have a female teacher. They are less
likely to be absent from school forwork reasons, and nomore
likely to be absent for family reasons. They are signiﬁcantly
more likely to receive help with their homework, and have
their homework and schoolwork checked.
The main advantage of SACMEQ compared to PASEC is
its wealth of variables on the quality of the pupil’s learn-
ing environment, both at home and at school. In particular,
the availability of multiple pupil-speciﬁc measures of access
to learning resources within the school allows us to control
for potential discrimination in access to school inputs, be it in
terms of access to physical inputs (chair, desk, teachingmate-
rials etc.) or in terms of attention received from the teacher.
At school, girls are signiﬁcantly more likely to report that
their teacher always checks their work, and more likely to
have access to individual equipment such as a chair and desk.
Despite being enrolled in schools with better equipped class-
rooms, they are nomore likely than boys to have single use of
a math text book during class. It is unclear from the raw data
whether the female advantage in access to individual school
inputs such as chairs and desks is driven by school hetero-
geneity or by better access to these inputs within a given
school. Our school ﬁxed-effects estimates shed more light on
this. Finally, the girls observed in the sample live in areaswith
a smaller share of uneducated adult women, a lower fertility
rate, and a lower share of the population deﬁning themselves
as Muslim.
The PASEC data in Table 1b paint a similar picture. Girls
who we observe in schools come fromwealthier households,
and aremore likely to have a literate father, a literatemother,
to eat regular daily meals, to receive parental help and help
from a tutor with school work. Table 1b also reveals gender-
speciﬁc patterns of work outside the school among PASEC
countries: girls are much more likely to be involved in do-
mestic work at home, while boys aremore often employed in
agriculture or trade. However, there is no statistically signiﬁ-
cant difference in self-reported schooling issues due to work,
be it in terms of ability to study at home or at school, or with
respect to attendance. Girls are more likely to be enrolled in
private schools and to have a female teacher. However, there
is no gender difference in the average level of class equipment
or in the individual pupil access to a maths book in class or in
whether the individual pupil receives homework help from
the school teacher.
The area characteristics matched into the PASEC data re-
veal a similar pattern to that discussed above for SACMEQ. In
brief, as a result of variation in female-to-male school enrol-
ment in Sub-Saharan Africa, girls who are enrolled in school
come from richer areas, and areas with signiﬁcantly different
cultural traits than boys.
It is also interesting to note that areas covered by the two
surveys are quite different in terms both of economic devel-
opment and cultural characteristics. SACMEQ countries are
much richer on average (with an average GDP per capita in
2000 of US$1427 compared to US$936 for PASEC), have a
much lower proportion of uneducated female adults, lower
fertility, and less than 10% of the population is Muslim
compared to nearly 40% among PASEC countries, reﬂectingdifferences between Francophone and Anglophone Africa,
and providing a very varied sample of countries with which
to analyse gender differences in maths achievement.
So far we have seen that boys outperform girls in maths
in the raw data in both surveys taken as a whole. As a conse-
quence of the lower enrolment rates among girls than boys
in Sub-Saharan Africa, the girls in our in-school samples have
higher socio-economic status, and tend to have a better ed-
ucational environment at home and in school. We antici-
pate, therefore, that as we control for characteristics of their
parents, support with homework, school ﬁxed-effects, and
pupil-speciﬁc access to educational inputs within schools,
the gender gap should increase unless anti-girl discrimina-
tion is suﬃciently strong to reverse the SES gradient working
in favour of girls. In the next section, we investigate whether,
in the raw data, girls perform consistently badly relative to
boys, or whether the gender gap only appears under certain
circumstances.
4.2. Gender gap by characteristics
Tables 2a and 2b present the gender differential (girls-
boys) in different strata of the population for the SACMEQ
and PASEC datasets respectively. We report the raw gap by
characteristics of particular interest, namely socio-economic
status, parental literacy, school type and level of equipment,
teacher gender and, where DHS data are available, socioeco-
nomic characteristics of the region. For example, the ﬁrst
row of Table 2a reports that amongst the SACMEQ fami-
lies categorised as ‘poor’ (bottom tercile), the gender gap is
−0.128 sd, whilst amongst families not categorised as poor, it
is −0.081 sd. The difference in the gender gap between these
two types of families is −0.047 sd which is statistically sig-
niﬁcant, with the gap being greater in poor families. For con-
tinuous variables, we deﬁne categories as above/below the
sample-speciﬁc median of the variable. For SACMEQ coun-
tries,we collapse thenumber of years of educationofmothers
and fathers into two categories (no education/at least some
education) for comparability with the literate/illiterate in-
formation available in the PASEC datasets. Here we focus on
strata deﬁned by individual, school-level, or regional char-
acteristics. Since the proportion of the population in each of
these strata differs across countries, differences in the gender
gap between these strata would imply differences in the gen-
der gap between countries, as conﬁrmed by results reported
in Section 5.5.
For the SACMEQ data, we ﬁnd that the gender gap does
not vary systematically with household wealth, but there are
striking differences when cutting the data by maternal edu-
cation, teacher gender, level of class equipment, and regional
characteristics. The female disadvantage is more than dou-
bled amongst children of mothers with no schooling and
nearly twice as large amongst girls with a male teacher. In
single-sex schools, girls perform considerably worse than
boys in single-sex schools, and much worse than in mixed
schools.8 Differences are particularly striking when divid-
ing the sample along societal characteristics, such that the
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Table 2a
SACMEQ – gender difference in maths score by selected characteristics.
Characteristic (1) (2) (3) = (1) − (2)
Status: ‘YES’ ‘NO’
Gender gap N Gender gap N Difference in gender gap N
Wealth
Poorest tercile −0.128∗∗∗ 12,388 −0.081∗∗∗ 24,774 −0.047∗∗ 37,162
Middle tercile −0.060∗∗∗ 12,392 −0.100∗∗∗ 24,770 0.040∗ 37,162
Richest tercile −0.101∗∗∗ 12,382 −0.090∗∗∗ 24,780 −0.011 37,162
Educated father −0.081∗∗∗ 26,087 −0.114∗∗∗ 2,839 0.064 28,926
Educated mother −0.083∗∗ 27,802 −0.179∗∗∗ 3,503 0.097∗∗∗ 31,305
Rural school −0.098∗∗∗ 21,420 −0.081∗∗∗ 15,742 −0.017 37,162
Public school −0.088∗∗∗ 33,517 −0.102∗∗∗ 3,645 0.014 37,162
Single-sex school −0.470∗∗∗ 318 −0.084∗∗∗ 36,844 −0.386∗∗∗ 37,162
Female maths teacher −0.055∗∗∗ 15,250 −0.105∗∗∗ 21,138 0.049∗∗ 36,388
Above-median class equipment −0.046∗∗∗ 24,035 −0.179∗∗∗ 12,475 0.134∗∗∗ 36,510
Above-median regional TFR −0.200∗∗∗ 15,471 −0.035∗∗ 15,224 −0.164∗∗∗ 30,695
Above-median regional share Muslim −0.166∗∗∗ 15,408 −0.018 15,287 −0.148∗∗∗ 30,695
Above-median regional share uneducated women −0.167∗∗∗ 15,565 −0.052∗∗∗ 15,130 −0.114∗∗∗ 30,695
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SACMEQ II and DHS data, as described in Section 3.
Notes:
The t-tests reported in columns (1) and (2) are for the size and signiﬁcance of the gender gap (girls–boys) for those with the characteristic listed in
the ﬁrst column (status: ‘YES’) and for those without the characteristic (status: ‘NO’) respectively. In Column (3) we report the size and signiﬁcance
for the difference in the gender gap between those with and without the characteristic.
∗ p < 0.10.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2b
PASEC – gender difference in maths score by selected characteristics.
Characteristic (1) (2) (3) = (1) − (2)
Status: ‘YES’ ‘NO’
Gender gap N Gender gap N Difference in gender gap N
Wealth
Poorest tercile −0.052 2870 −0.030 8,274 −0.023 11,144
Middle tercile −0.048∗ 4652 −0.027 6,492 −0.021 11,144
Richest tercile −0.035 3618 −0.050∗∗ 7,526 0.015 11,144
Literate father −0.033 8134 −0.129∗∗∗ 3,010 0.097∗∗ 11,144
Literate mother −0.009 6041 −0.151∗∗∗ 5,103 0.142∗∗∗ 11,144
Rural school −0.034 5299 −0.046∗ 5,845 0.012 11,144
Public school −0.064∗∗∗ 9583 0.052 1,561 −0.116∗∗ 11,144
Single-sex school 0.417∗∗∗ 202 −0.040∗∗ 10,942 0.457∗∗∗ 11,144
Female maths teacher −0.003 3184 −0.061∗∗∗ 7,960 0.058 11,144
Above-median class equipment 0.009 5973 −0.082∗∗∗ 5,171 0.091∗∗ 11,144
Above-median regional TFR −0.070∗∗∗ 5874 0.001 5,218 −0.071∗ 11,092
Above-median regional share Muslim −0.160∗∗∗ 5546 0.024 5,546 −0.184∗∗∗ 11,092
Above-median regional share uneducated women −0.148∗∗∗ 5792 0.017 5,300 −0.165∗∗∗ 11,092
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PASEC and DHS data, as described in Section 3.
Notes:
The t-tests reported in columns (1) and (2) are for the size and signiﬁcance of the gender gap (girls–boys) for those with the characteristic listed in
the ﬁrst column (status: ‘YES’) and for those without the characteristic (status: ‘NO’) respectively. In Column (3) we report the size and signiﬁcance
for the difference in the gender gap between those with and without the characteristic.
∗ p < 0.10.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.gap disappears in areas with a below-median share of Mus-
lims in the regional population, and is much lower in regions
with below-median shares of uneducated adult women and
below-median total fertility rates.
The sensitivity of the gender gap is particularly marked in
the PASEC sample (Table 2b). For instance, a gap is only ob-
served among children of illiterate parents, when the maths
teacher is male, or where regional fertility or the share of
the Muslim population or the regional share of uneducatedadult women is above-median. Contrary to SACMEQ coun-
tries, girls do much better than boys in single sex schools,
and better than in mixed schools (although the number of
children in single-sex schools is again small, and are mostly
concentrated in Mauritania). From the raw data, it is thus
clear that the size of the gender gap varies across character-
istics, such that girls do not do worse than boys in maths in
all subgroups of the population. Of course, in Tables 2a and
2b, the characteristics of interest (e.g., maternal education
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Table 3a
SACMEQ – distribution of scores.
Distribution percentile or moment Ratio of #girls/#boys
1% 1.035
5% 1.077
10% 1.047
Below median (bottom 50%) 1.055
Below mean 1.042
Above mean 0.881
Above median (top 50%) 0.882
90% 0.834
95% 0.798
99% 0.808
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SACMEQ II data, as de-
scribed in Section 3.
Note: The ratio of girls to boys in the entire SACMEQ distribution
is 0.968.
Table 3b
PASEC – distribution of scores.
Distribution percentile or moment Ratio of #girls/#boys
1% 0.687
5% 0.947
10% 0.942
Below median (bottom 50%) 0.851
Below mean 0.851
Above mean 0.840
Above median (top 50%) 0.840
90% 0.819
95% 0.779
99% 0.661
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PASEC, as described in
Section 3.
Note: The ratio of girls to boys in the entire PASEC distribution is
0.846.or literacy) may simply be acting as a proxy for a corre-
lated characteristic, be it one(s) which we cannot observe, or
one(s) which we do observe (e.g., teacher gender), but which
we do not control for in these ‘univariate’ comparisons. In
Section 5, we shed more light on the robustness of the inter-
actions between gender and parental-, school-, and regional
characteristics by including these interactions in a stepwise
fashion in our main regressions.
4.3. Distribution of scores
We have concentrated so far on average test scores by
gender, but a number of previous studies on gender gaps
in mathematics have focused on the over-representation of
males at the top of the distribution of scores. Indeed, in the
US, where females have recently caught up with males in
terms of the number of science and maths courses taken in
high-school and in terms of enrolment at the undergraduate
level in science and engineering (Goldin, Katz, & Kuziemko,
2006), attention has turned to the top of the distribution both
in high-school and in the upper echelons of professionals,
where a substantial gap persists (Pope and Sydnor, 2010).
Following Fryer and Levitt (2009) and Pope and Sydnor
(2010),we calculate the gender ratio (number of girls to num-
ber of boys) at various percentiles of the test score distribu-
tion. These are reported in Tables 3a and 3b for SACMEQ
and PASEC, respectively. For SACMEQ, the overall genderratio is 0.968. If boys and girls are equally distributed across
the maths ability distribution, we would expect to see this
ratio replicated at all percentiles of the distribution of scores.
Table 3a shows that this is not the case, but also that the gen-
der gap observed in the means is not being simply driven by
the extreme tails of the distribution. Instead, girls are equally
over-represented below the mean (1.042) or median (1.055)
as in the extreme lower tail (1.035), and fairly equally under-
represented above the mean (0.881) or median (0.882) as at
the very upper tail (0.808). Among the smaller set of PASEC
countries, where the overall gender ratio is 0.846, there is a
more marked degree of underrepresentation of females both
at the very bottom and at the very top of the distribution.
However, taken together, the distributional patterns for the
12 SACMEQ countries and 7 PASEC countries justify our in-
terest in the average gender gap.
5. Regression results
5.1. Pooled regressions
Tables 4a and 4b report the results from a multivariate
analysis of maths test scores, for the pooled SACMEQ and
PASEC (Grade 5 ﬁnal) samples respectively. Moving from left
to right in the table, the estimated equations are gradually
built up in terms of the explanatory variables that they in-
clude, the aim being to investigate whether any of the corre-
lations between our explanatory variables and gender can ac-
count for the observed gender difference inmaths test scores.
Given our analysis of the characteristics of boys and girls in
the raw data (Tables 1a and 1b, as discussed in Section 4.1),
our hypothesis is that controlling for these various factors
will not reduce the gender gap unless discrimination against
girls is strong enough to reverse the socio-economic status
gradient.
Column(1) ineach table reports the simplest speciﬁcation,
which includes only the female dummy variable and country
ﬁxed-effects. Looking within countries, therefore, girls score
onaverage, 0.06 (0.09) sd lower thanboys in SACMEQ(PASEC)
countries, both differences being statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. The subsequent columns in each table add ex-
planatory variables in order to investigatewhether the corre-
lation between gender and those variables affects the gender
coeﬃcient, so allowing us to test a range of hypotheses about
the proximate causes of the gender gap.
5.2. Do boys go to better schools?
So far, we have considered average performance across
schools. In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, it could be the
case that parents send their sons to better schools than their
daughters, for the same reason as the enrolment statistics
show that they are more likely to send their sons to school
than their daughters. Column (2) tests this hypothesis by in-
troducing school ﬁxed-effects. In both data sets, however,
this actually increases the size of the female disadvantage in
maths test scores, thus indicating that, on the contrary, girls
tend to be enrolled in schools where pupils perform better
at maths tests. The same result is obtained in the majority of
OECD countries considered by Bedard and Cho (2010).
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Table 4a
SACMEQ – pooled regressions.
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed effects: Country FE School FE School FE School FE
Female −0.063∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Botswana 0.216∗∗∗
(0.016)
Kenya 0.770∗∗∗
(0.016)
Lesotho −0.463∗∗∗
(0.016)
Malawi −0.607∗∗∗
(0.019)
Mauritius 0.880∗∗∗
(0.017)
Mozambique 0.321∗∗∗
(0.016)
Namibia −0.528∗∗∗
(0.013)
South Africa −0.138∗∗∗
(0.016)
Swaziland 0.256∗∗∗
(0.016)
Tanzania 0.268∗∗∗
(0.017)
Uganda 0.119∗∗∗
(0.017)
Zambia −0.604∗∗∗
(0.018)
Individual pupil access to schooling inputs + age × × √ √
Home environment × × × √
No. of children 37,407 37,407 37,162 37,162
No. of schools 2125 2125 2110 2110
R2 (within-school from Column (3)) 0.242 0.003 0.029 0.052
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SACMEQ II data, as described in Section 3.
Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses.
(2) Regressors corresponding to the categories “individual pupil access to schooling inputs” and “home envi-
ronment” are listed in Table 1a.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.5.3. Are boys and girls treated differently within schools?
One potential explanation for observing a gender gap
within schools is that girls and boys are treated differently
within schools, as suggested, e.g., in Colclough, Rose and
Tembon (2000). In Column (3) we test this hypothesis by
adding controls for pupil-speciﬁc access to school inputs.
For the SACMEQ survey, the added variables are: whether
the pupil has access to a maths textbook in class, whether
the pupil has access to an individual maths text book in
class (omitted category: the pupil does not have access to
a maths textbook in class), one binary indicator for each of
the following four cases: the teacher corrects their maths
homework sometimes, most times, always, or they do not
get maths homework (omitted category: the teacher never
corrects their maths homework), whether the pupil sits on
a chair in class, whether the pupil writes on a desk in class,
a variable equal to the number of stationery items the in-
dividual pupil has access to in class (from 0 to 8: exercise
book, note book, pencil, sharpener, eraser, ruler, pen, folder),
and whether the pupil can borrow books from the school
library. For the PASEC survey, pupil-speciﬁc information is
only available on whether they have access to a maths bookin class which they can take home with them, and whether
they receive help with homework from their teacher. In both
data sets, however, the addition of these variables does not
close the gender gap in maths scores, with the gap actually
widening signiﬁcantly in the SACMEQ countries. It is not the
case, therefore, that discrimination against girls in the formof
lower access to help or resources within schools is hindering
girls.
5.4. Do girls come from poorer and/or less supportive
households?
Column (4) in each table additionally includes controls
for the home environment. These variables vary somewhat
between the two surveys, withmore information being avail-
able in the SACMEQ survey. In both surveys, controls for
family background and educational environment at home
include measures of family income, parental education, liv-
ing arrangements, availability of regular meals, what type
of help, if any, is available for school work at home (specif-
ically for maths in the SACMEQ regressions), and variables
capturing reasons for missing school days (SACMEQ) or as-
pects of child labour (PASEC). The full list of variables can be
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Table 4b
PASEC – pooled regressions across countries.
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fixed effects: Country FE School FE School FE School FE School FE School FE
Female −0.089∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
Benin −0.310∗∗∗
(0.021)
Cameroon 0.440∗∗∗
(0.022)
Chad −0.317∗∗∗
(0.025)
Gabon 0.323∗∗∗
(0.024)
Guinea −0.053∗∗∗
(0.020)
Madagascar 0.771∗∗∗
(0.022)
Mauritania −0.809∗∗∗
(0.024)
Initial score 0.401∗∗∗
(0.009)
Individual pupil access to schooling inputs + age: × × √ √ √ √
Home environment: × × × √ √ √
No. of children 11,904 11,904 11,761 11,144 10,055 11,144
No. of schools 933 933 933 930 929 930
R2 (within-school from Column (3)) 0.244 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.183
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PASEC data, as described in Section 3.
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses. (2) Regressors corresponding to the categories “individual pupil access to schooling inputs” and
“home environment” are listed in Table 1b. (3) Column (5) is the same speciﬁcation as Column (4) but excludes the imputed values. (4)
Column (6) is the same speciﬁcation as Column (4) but includes the score at the beginning of the year and hence reﬂects value-added during
grade.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
10 The raw data in Table 1b showed that the raw gender gap appears to befound in Tables 1a and 1b. However, in both data sets, the
gender gap is virtually identical to that observed in the pre-
vious column. Controlling for a long list of household charac-
teristics and the educational environment at home does not
help to explain the gender gap at all, and so the reason for
girls’ poorer performance is not that they come from house-
holds where conditions are less favourable to the production
of mathematical cognitive skills.
The PASEC results in Table 4b contain two more columns.
As a robustness check, Column (5) restricts the sample to ob-
servations with no imputed values for any variable.9 As can
be seen, the coeﬃcients are robust to this change, suggesting
that imputed values are not affecting the results. Finally, Col-
umn (6) adds a control for performance at a pre-test (distinct
from the end-of-year test) at the beginning of the academic
year, and thus considers progress duringGrade 5 froma given
initial level. The results show that over the course of Grade 5,
girls progress by0.045 sd less thanboys. Thus, amongst pupils
who are observed at both the start and the end of Grade 5,
the gap in performance on maths tests between boys and9 In both surveys, variables are imputedwhere an individual value ismiss-
ing, but where the share of missing values within the school is less than
15%. Continuous variables are replaced by the school mean, and categorical
variables by the school mode. Where more than 15% of values are missing
within the school, values are not imputed. Contrary to the PASEC survey, the
SACMEQ dataset does not contain the raw data, only imputed values, so that
this robustness check can only be performed for PASEC.girls is widening; from a given starting point, girls make less
progress than boys during the course of Grade 5.10
For PASEC,we are also able to conduct regression analyses
at the beginning of Grade 5 and at the beginning and end of
Grade 2. The results reveal that the girls lag boys inmaths test
scores at each of these points, and the magnitude of the gap
is about the same in Grade 2 as in Grade 5 (observed at the
same point in time for the two different cohorts). The gen-
der gap in maths scores is therefore present at all points of
the school system surveyed in SACMEQ and PASEC, and can-
not be accounted for by gender differences in school quality,
within-school gender discrimination in access to schooling
inputs, or gender differences in family socio-economics sta-
tus or the schooling environment at home. This is consis-
tent with the ﬁndings for developed countries obtained bysmaller at the end of Grade 5 than at the beginning. This is due to the fact
that the raw average scores are calculated separately for those present at the
start of Grade 5, and for the lower number present at the end of Grade 5. The
value-added speciﬁcation in Table 4b is estimated only on those observed
at both the beginning and end of Grade 5. The difference between the two
is therefore those who drop out during the year. Analysis of the data shows
that such drop-outs aremore likely to be low-achieving, and alsomore likely
to be girls. Thus in the raw data in Table 1b, there are more low-achieving
girls in the sample at the start of Grade 5 than at the end, explaining the
apparent relative improvement by girls on average, whilst Table 4b is based
only on those pupils observed both at the beginning and end of Grade 5, for
whom the gap between boys and girls is shown to grow.
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Fig. 1. Raw and residual gender gaps. Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Southern and Eastern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality
(SACMEQ II) (Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania (Mainland), Uganda, Zambia) and Program
for the Analysis of Education Systems (PASEC) (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania).Fryer and Levitt (2010). Indeed, in their analysis as well as
ours, the gender gap increases as more controls for environ-
mental factors are included in the regression.
5.5. Do girls have worse characteristics (individual country
analysis)?
As well as the pooled analyses discussed in the previous
sub-sections, we also ran the same set of speciﬁcations for
each country individually. The results are reported in Ap-
pendix A, Tables A2 and A3 for SACMEQ and PASEC countries
respectively. The speciﬁcationsmirror those estimated in the
previous sub-sections, with the obvious exception that coun-
try level ﬁxed-effects analyses are no longer estimated. For
the sake of brevity, here we focus on the gender gaps ob-
tained in the raw data (Column (1)) and in the speciﬁcation
including the full set of controls (Column (4)), as illustrated
in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 plots the size of the gender gap in maths in each
country, both in the raw data (left-hand side) and after ac-
counting comprehensively for differences in family back-
ground, the schooling environment at home and at school
(right-hand side). Similar to the pooled regressions reported
in Tables 4a and 4b, the gap tends to widen further as we
include more covariates. In the raw data, girls have (signiﬁ-
cantly) lower scores in (10) 14 countries and (signiﬁcantly)
higher scores in (3) 5 countries. When comparing boys and
girls with similar characteristics, girls obtain (signiﬁcantly)
lower scores in (14) 17 out of the 19 countries, and neither of
the two gender gaps in favour of girls is statistically signiﬁ-
cant. However, the magnitude of the gap varies widely, from
a non-signiﬁcant 0.06 sd advantage in Mauritius to as much
as a 0.34 sd disadvantage in Tanzania.For PASEC countries, Column (6) of Table A3 reports the
results from the value added speciﬁcation. In all countries
except Cameroon, the female coeﬃcient is also negative in
this speciﬁcation, suggesting that the gap between boys and
girls widens during Grade 5, and by a statistically signiﬁcant
amount in four of the countries.
In conclusion, a consistent gender gap inmaths scores has
been observed in both the pooled SACMEQ and PASEC data
sets, and in almost all countries when analysed separately.
The fact that the gender gap differs in size across countries
suggests the absence of a common genetic explanation for
why boys do better on average. Neither does the gap stem
from gender differences in school quality, or from within-
school gender discrimination in access to schooling inputs, or
from gender differences in family SES or from the schooling
environment at home.
However, in Tables 2a and 2b, we showed that the gen-
der gap varies considerably across population sub-groups.
Similarly, the results in Fig. 1 showed that the size of the gen-
der gap varies across countries (and is negligible or absent
in some countries). Thus it appears that girls only do worse
when gender is compounded by other characteristics. In the
next section, we analyse the sources of variation in the gen-
der gap in amore systematicmanner, and in the process shed
light on the nature of the gap.
5.6. Under what conditions does the gap arise?
The regression analysis discussed above investigated
whether boys and girls differed in terms of their observed
characteristics, in ways which affected their relative maths
performance. The conclusion is they do not. The analysis
in this section asks whether boys and girls, exposed to the
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Table 5a
SACMEQ – pooled regressions with interactions.
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interactions: Baseline Parent ed. School Regional All
Female −0.109∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.037∗∗∗ −0.042
(0.007) (0.009) (0.024) (0.013) (0.030)
Female × uneducated father 0.033 0.019
(0.025) (0.023)
Female × father education missing 0.050∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.019) (0.019)
Female × uneducated mother −0.052∗∗ −0.023
(0.023) (0.025)
Female × mother education missing 0.009 0.012
(0.021) (0.019)
Female × public school −0.050∗∗ −0.004
(0.024) (0.029)
Female × male teacher −0.030∗∗ 0.001
(0.014) (0.015)
Female × below-median class equipment −0.102∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.015) (0.015)
Female × above-median regional share uneducated women −0.050∗ −0.047∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Female × above-median regional TFR −0.051∗ −0.048∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Female × above-median regional share Muslim −0.106∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025)
Individual pupil access to schooling inputs + age √ √ √ √ √
Home environment
√ √ √ √ √
No. of children 37,162 37,162 36,388 30,695 29,921
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SACMEQ II and DHS data, as described in Section 3.
Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses.
(2) School ﬁxed-effects estimates. The baseline speciﬁcation in Column (1) is repeated from Table 4a, Column (4).
(3) Regressors corresponding to the categories “individual pupil access to schooling inputs” and “home environment” are listed in
Table 1a.
(4) School/classroom environment and regional characteristics are not included in levels because they are subsumed in the school
ﬁxed effects.
(5) Standard errors for Columns (4) and (5) are clustered at the regional level.
∗ p < 0.10.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.same societal and cultural factors, are affected by those fac-
tors differently (e.g., because these inﬂuences lead to gen-
uine or perceived gender-speciﬁc returns to maths skills or
to stereotype threats, in ways that are not captured by indi-
vidual regressors). If so, then variation in those factors across
groups or space can help explain variation in the size of the
gap. Our approach is to interact the gender indicator with
various parental, school, and regional characteristics, which
appear to be unfavourable to female performance in maths
in the raw data (Section 4). Namely, we have seen that the
gap is much reduced among children whose parents are ed-
ucated, who have a female (maths) teacher, attend a well-
equipped school, and live in regions where regional fertility,
or the share of the Muslim population, or the regional share
of uneducated adult women is below-median. We now in-
clude interaction terms between female gender and these
characteristics in our full school ﬁxed-effects speciﬁcation
in order to: (i) measure the extent to which the residual
gap is reduced in these favourable circumstances after con-
trolling for gender differences in observable characteristics;
and (ii) shed light on possible causes for the gender gap.
Note that both school and regional variables in levels aresubsumed in the school ﬁxed-effects. Therefore, we need not,
and indeed cannot, include these variables in levels. Parental
characteristics are included in levels along with all the other
covariates included in Column (4) of Table 4a (SACMEQ)
or 4b (PASEC). The results are presented in Tables 5a and
5b for SACMEQ and PASEC respectively. Column (1) repeats
the full speciﬁcation from Tables 4a and 4b Column (4) (i.e.
without interactions), to provide the comparison. We then
add interactions between the gender variable and parental
education in Column (2). In both groups of countries, af-
ter controlling comprehensively for observable gender dif-
ferences, the gender gap remains substantial among chil-
dren of educated/literate mothers, although it is signiﬁcantly
worse among children of uneducated mothers in SACMEQ
countries and among children of illiterate fathers in PASEC
countries. It should be noted that in SACMEQ, children were
asked to report thehighest educational level obtainedby each
parent, whereas in PASEC they were simply asked whether
each parent was literate or not. The SACMEQ question on
parental education is thus substantially harder for the child
to answer, and as a consequence, parental education is often
missing in this survey (see Table 1a). We therefore keep the
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Table 5b
PASEC – pooled regressions with interactions.
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interactions: Baseline Parent ed. School Regional All
Female −0.114∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.054 −0.067∗∗ −0.034
(0.013) (0.017) (0.040) (0.030) (0.053)
Female × illiterate father −0.053∗ −0.037
(0.032) (0.030)
Female × illiterate mother −0.032 0.008
(0.028) (0.030)
Female × public school −0.058 −0.033
(0.036) (0.030)
Female × male teacher −0.006 0.008
(0.028) (0.046)
Female × below-median class equipment −0.013 −0.023
(0.025) (0.023)
Female × above-median regional share uneducated women −0.092∗∗ −0.089∗∗
(0.034) (0.036)
Female × above-median regional TFR −0.005 −0.001
(0.033) (0.032)
Female × above-median regional share Muslim 0.004 0.010
(0.031) (0.031)
Individual pupil access to schooling inputs + age √ √ √ √ √
Home environment
√ √ √ √ √
No. of children 11,144 11,144 11,144 11,092 11,092
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PASEC and DHS data, as described in Section 3.
Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses.
(2) School ﬁxed-effects estimates. The baseline speciﬁcation in Column (1) is repeated from Table 4b, Column (5).
(3) Regressors corresponding to the categories “individual pupil access to schooling inputs” and “home environment” are listed in
Table 1b.
(4) School/classroom environment and regional characteristics are not included in levels because they are subsumed in the school
ﬁxed effects.
(5) Standard errors for Columns (4) and (5) are clustered at the regional level.
∗ p < 0.10.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.missing paternal/maternal education categories separate in
the analysis.11
Next we add to the baseline speciﬁcation interaction
terms between female gender and school characteristics
which we have seen are correlated with a greater female dis-
advantage in the raw data. Results in Column (3) of Table 5a
show that, in the SACMEQ sample, the residual gender gap
disappears among children enrolled in well-equipped pri-
vate schools who have a female math teacher, and each of
these three characteristics (above-median equipment, pri-
vate schooling, female teacher) signiﬁcantly contribute to
improving female relative performance. In PASEC countries,
the gap also becomes statistically insigniﬁcant in this more
favourable school environment, but the point estimate is still
0.054 sd and none of these school characteristics signiﬁcantly
contributes to reducing the gap (Column (3) of Table 5b).
We then add to the baseline speciﬁcation interaction
terms between female gender and regional characteristics
as presented in Column (4) of Tables 5a and 5b, and we now
cluster standard errors at the regional level to prevent artiﬁ-
cial inﬂation of the t-statistics on regional interactions due to11 When allowing all parameters to differ betweenboys and girls (including
school ﬁxed effects), the negative effect on math scores of having an unedu-
cated mother is more pronounced for girls than boys for SACMEQ countries,
but there is no gender difference in the effect of parental literacy in PASEC
countries.positively correlated standard errors within regions. In both
surveys, the residual gender gap is statistically signiﬁcant but
much reducedamong children living in regionswhere the gap
appears smaller in the raw data, i.e., in regions with fewer
uneducated adult women, lower fertility rates, and a smaller
share of the population being Muslim. In SACMEQ countries,
each of these characteristics signiﬁcantly contributes to re-
ducing the gap (i.e., the individual coeﬃcient on interactions
between female gender and above-median regional charac-
teristics are negative and statistically signiﬁcant). In PASEC
countries, however, only the interaction with the share of
uneducated adult women is statistically signiﬁcant, and con-
ditioning on this interaction, the interactions with above-
median fertility rates and above-median share of Muslims
are essentially zero.
Finally, in the last column of each table we include all in-
teraction terms simultaneously in order to testwhether some
interactions are proxying for others (e.g., because maternal
education, teacher gender, and the regional share of unedu-
cated women are correlated).
The results show that the coeﬃcients on the interaction
termswith parental education and,more dramatically so, the
coeﬃcients on the interaction terms with school character-
istics, decrease (by an order of magnitude for school charac-
teristics) and become statistically insigniﬁcant, whereas the
coeﬃcients on the interaction terms between female gender
and regional characteristics are almost unchanged. It thus
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and, to a lesser extent, for some types of parents, only be-
cause these school- and parental characteristics are captur-
ing some characteristic of the broader societies in which the
children live. Note that not all regions of every country are
covered by the DHS, and so we lose some observations when
including these interaction terms (see Section 3.3). In par-
ticular, SACMEQ countries are richer, so that some of them
are not covered by DHS surveys. In addition, we lose over a
third of Ugandan schools due to missing teacher gender and
class equipment data. In contrast, all PASEC countries are cov-
ered by DHS surveys, and so the loss of observations due to
some regions not being covered is only minimal. Restricting
the samples used in Tables 5a and 5b to observations with
complete data does not change our conclusions (results are
available upon request).12 These results for the gender gap
in average scores are consistent with those obtained by Pope
and Sydnor (2010) for gender gaps at the top of the distri-
bution among U.S. 8th graders. Indeed, they demonstrated
the importance of differences in regional characteristics, in
their case between states in the US, showing that the extent
to which test scores adhere to gender stereotypes at the top
end of the test score distribution is smaller in those states
with more gender-neutral cultural attitudes.
Furthermore, relative female-to-male enrolment rates are
lowerwhere fertility is higher, where the share ofMuslims in
the population is higher, andwhere a larger share of the adult
female population is uneducated as can be seen by compar-
ing the mean values for these three variables by gender in
Tables 1a and 1b. Girls observed in schools in regions charac-
terised by higher fertility, higher Muslim share, and a greater
proportion of uneducated women are thus likely to be more
positively selected relative to boys in these regions. There-
fore, we expect the worsening of the gender gap in these
regions shown in Tables 5a and 5b to underestimate the true
extent of the worsening.
In summary, we have shown that the gender gap is much
reduced, and even disappears in some segments of the pop-
ulation, even after controlling comprehensively for gender
differences in family background, school quality, and access
to schooling inputs within the class and at home. Further-
more, societal factors appear to be more predictive of the
gender gap than parental education or school-level factors
including teacher gender, thus suggesting that a substantial
portion of the gender gap in maths arises as a consequence
of societal inﬂuences.13 We do not give a causal interpreta-
tion to the coeﬃcients estimated here, but our results suggest
that the gap is much larger where the role of women in so-12 For the PASEC countries, we can also estimate a value-added speciﬁca-
tion controlling for maths scores at the beginning of Grade 5, as was done in
Column 6 of Table 4b, although we lack statistical power to identify the con-
tribution of interaction terms to the portion of the gender gap accumulated
during Grade 5. While the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant, the coeﬃcient magnitude suggests that the contribution
of the variable ‘above-median regional share of uneducated adult women’
to the gap accumulated during Grade 5 is proportional to its contribution to
the overall gap.
13 Given that Chad has a signiﬁcantly lower female–male enrolment ratio
than the other countries in the sample (see Fig. A1), we checked the robust-
ness of the results to the exclusion of Chad from the PASEC sample, and found
the conclusions to be unchanged.ciety is conﬁned to the home (i.e., where fertility is high, the
current generation of adult women has little schooling, and
where Islam is more prevalent). This echoes previous ﬁnd-
ings by Guiso et al. (2008) for PISA countries, where the gap
was found to decrease with higher levels of female empow-
erment as measured by a higher GGI. However, it may also
be the case that our regional variables simply proxy for eco-
nomic development. To further probe this hypothesis and
for comparability with earlier literature, we complete our
exploration of the data with cross-country regressions inves-
tigating the relationship between the gender maths gap and
country characteristics.
5.7. Cross-country analysis
The results are reported in Tables 6 and 7. The dependent
variable in these regressions is the difference between aver-
age female and male performance on maths tests, measured
as the difference in mean standardised scores. Both SACMEQ
and PASEC countries are included in these analyses so as to
provide an overall picture.
The focus of our attention is on indicators of female em-
powerment. Similar to the regional characteristics considered
earlier, we use the national total fertility rate (TFR) and the
share of Muslims in the population, which are available for
every country in our dataset (contrary to measures based
on the World Value Survey, the Afrobarometer, or the GGI,
which are only available for a subset of countries in our sam-
ple). The results in the ﬁrst column of Table 6 ﬁrst suggest
that differences in GDP per capita are important, with the
average gap being smaller in richer countries (Column (1)).
However, the coeﬃcient on GDP per capita is reduced by a
factor of ﬁve and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant when in-
cluding a control for the total fertility rate (Column (2)). The
results in Table 6 thus reveal that higher fertility rates are as-
sociated with poorer performance of girls compared to boys
on maths tests, even after controlling for levels of economic
development. On the contrary, variation in the share Muslim
in the country population does not account for cross-country
variation in the gender gap (Column (4)). Interestingly, the R-
squared obtained when regressing the gender gap on the fer-
tility rate is 43%, which is very similar to the 40% obtained by
Pope and Sydnor (2010) when regressing their US state-level
stereotypical gender index on the proportion of individuals
agreeing with the statement that “women are better suited
for the home” in that state. Following Guiso et al. (2008), in
Column(7)wecheck the sensitivityof theeffect of the fertility
rate to controlling for genetic factors thatmight be correlated
both with our measure of female empowerment (fertility in
our case) and gender differences in cognitive ability. In or-
der to do so, we expand the dataset into a full set of country
dyads and use the measure of genetic distance between the
population of each pair of countries compiled by Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2009). The estimate of the effect of the pair-
wise difference in fertility rates on the pair-wise difference
in relative female performance is virtually unchanged after
controlling for genetic distance (cf. Columns (6) and (7)). A
lower fertility rate may inﬂuence future expected returns to
female schooling by lowering expected maternal mortality
(Jayachandran & Lleras-Muney, 2009). However, in Column
(5) in which we replace the total fertility rate as of 2000 with
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Table 6
Cross-country regressions.
Variables Difference in standardized scores (girl–boy) Pairwise difference in scores (girl–boy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP per capita/100 0.005∗∗ 0.001 0.005∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total fertility rate (TFR) −0.045∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.016)
Share Muslim in population 0.010
(0.088)
Maternal mortality rate 0.000
(0.000)
Pairwise difference in TFR −0.056∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Genetic distance 0.000
(0.000)
Constant −0.126∗∗∗ 0.136 0.208∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗ 0.012 0.012
(0.029) (0.139) (0.080) (0.040) (0.072) (0.023) (0.026)
Countries (1)–(5); country dyads (6), (7) 19 19 19 19 19 171 171
R2 0.321 0.449 0.434 0.321 0.360 0.438 0.438
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SACMEQ and PASEC data (test scores) and diverse sources listed below (regressors).
Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses.
(2) Data sources: GDP per capita in 2000 (IMF World Economic Outlook Database); national total fertility rate in 2000 (US Census Bureau International
Database); Share Muslim in population from CIA Factbook (2010a) except for Botswana and Zambia, which are from Kettani (2009). Maternal mortality in
2010 from CIA Factbook (2010b). Genetic distance from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009).
(3) Observations in Columns (6) and (7) are dyads. For these two regressions, standard errors are clustered at the country level.
∗ p < 0.10.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 7
Cross-country regressions – restricted to countries with GGI data.
Variables Difference in standardized scores (girl–boy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP per capita/100 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender Gap Index (GGI) −0.572
(0.461)
Economic sub-index −0.617∗∗
(0.238)
Educational sub-index −0.027
(0.197)
Health sub-index 2.623
(2.961)
Political sub-index −0.209
(0.313)
Primary GER parity index −0.007
(0.225)
Constant −0.130∗∗∗ 0.234 0.268 −0.108 −2.682 −0.105∗∗ −0.124
(0.029) (0.294) (0.156) (0.162) (2.881) (0.047) (0.202)
Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
R2 0.468 0.524 0.649 0.468 0.498 0.485 0.468
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SACMEQandPASECdata (test scores), Hausmannet al. (2007) (GGI index and subindexes)
and UNESCO (2006) (Primary GER parity index).
Notes:
(1) Standard errors in parentheses.
(2) The GGI comprises the following four sub-indexes: (i) Economic participation and opportunity as measured by a weighted
mean of 5 ratios, namely the ratio of female to male: labour force participation; wages; earned income; legislators, senior
oﬃcials and managers; professional and technical workers; (ii) educational attainment as measured by the weighted mean
of four ratios: literacy rate; net enrolment in: primary; in secondary; and in tertiary schooling; (iii) health and survival is
calculated as the weighted mean of female to male healthy life expectancy and female to male sex ratio at birth; (iv) political
empowerment is theweighted average of thewomen-to-men ratio of seats in parliament;ministers; and female-to-male years
as head of state during the last 50 years. GGI data is not available for: Gabon, Guinea, Swaziland. For all indexes, gender parity
implies a score of unity.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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(2010b), the latter is statistically insigniﬁcant and the coef-
ﬁcient on GDP per capita is almost unchanged compared to
Column (1). We also repeated the regressions in Tables 6 and
7 but excluding Chad, given its much lower school enrolment
rate for girls, and found similar results both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
In order to make comparisons with previous research, the
regressions in Table 7 include the key national level variables
that have been considered previously in the literature, for
the sample of 16 countries for which these data are available
(i.e., excluding Gabon, Guinea and Swaziland). The measure
of female empowerment often used, the GGI, relates to the
strength of female empowerment outside the home, rather
than themore private sphere considered by the fertilitymea-
sure in Table 6. The results in Column (1) show that the aver-
age gap is also smaller in richer countries among this sample
of 16 countries. Higher values of the GGI, indicating more
gender equality in the labour market, in terms of education
(including relative enrolment rates and thus relative selec-
tion into schooling), health and survival, and political em-
powerment, cannot account for better female performance
(Columns (2) to (6)), thus indicating that the relationship un-
covered by Guiso et al. (2008) in PISA countries, but shown by
Fryer and Levitt (2010) not to hold in TIMMS countries, does
not appear to apply to Sub-Saharan Africa either. Indeed, the
only statistically signiﬁcant effect suggests that more equal
economic participation is correlated with a larger disadvan-
tage in maths for women (Column (3)). It is acknowledged,
however, that the small number of observations mean that
the GGI coeﬃcients are not precisely estimated, and it is the
case that the upper bound of the 95% conﬁdence interval for
the coeﬃcient on the overall index is positive and suﬃciently
large enough to cancel out the gender maths gap.
Finally, we test whether the gender gap is larger where
the female/male relative enrolment rate is closer to parity (i.e.
where there is less selection into schooling for girls relative
to boys). Fig. A1 in the appendix suggests that this is unlikely
as it shows that the gender gap is larger in those countries
that enrol a relatively smaller proportion of their girls. To
conﬁrm this, in the ﬁnal column (Column (7)) of Table 7,
we regressed the national gender gap on the primary gross
enrolment ratio parity index (i.e., the ratio of female-to-male
gross enrolment ratios as per UNESCO (2006)). The results
show that differences in enrolment ratios had no inﬂuence
on the gender gap.14
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we provide the ﬁrst systematic assessment
of the gender gap in maths tests in Sub-Saharan Africa. Con-
trolling for a large set of observable characteristicsmeasuring
school quality, individual access to schooling inputs within
schools, family background and schooling inputs at home
does not reduce the gender gap. We can therefore rule out14 The point estimates in Column (7) of Table 7 show that an increase of
36 percentage points in the parity ratio, which corresponds to fully bridging
the gap between the lowest-parity country in the sample (Chad) and gender
parity in primary enrolment would only account for a change (a decrease) in
the gender gap by less than 0.003 of a standard deviation.gender differences in school quality, within-school gender
discrimination in access to schooling inputs, or gender differ-
ences in family SES and the schooling environment at home,
as explanations for the observed gap. In both groups of coun-
tries under scrutiny, the residual gender gap is approximately
0.1 sd after controlling for a large set of observable character-
istics. This order of magnitude is consistent with the gender
gaps observed in developed countries.
At ﬁrst glance, these ﬁndings may seem to suggest that
girls indeed have some sizeable natural disadvantage in
maths, since the gap is observed in Africa too, across most
countries, and is relatively stable both between the two
groups of countries included in our analysis and compared
to estimates for developed countries. However, a closer look
at the data shows that the overall gap hides considerable vari-
ation between groups, such that in the ‘right’ environment,
girls do not do signiﬁcantly worse than boys in maths.
When comparing boys and girls with similar character-
istics, girls obtain signiﬁcantly lower scores in 14 out of
19 countries. However, the magnitude of the gap varies
widely, from a non-signiﬁcant 0.06 sd advantage in Mauri-
tius to as much as a 0.34 sd disadvantage in Tanzania. The
raw gap also varies by characteristics of parents, schools
and region. When controlling for our large set of observ-
able characteristics, the gender gap is between 0.1 (PASEC)
and 0.2 (SACMEQ) sd larger in regions with above-median
rates of uneducated adult women, fertility, and share ofMus-
lims in the population.When the interaction between gender
and these regional characteristics is not controlled for, the
gap appears larger among children of uneducated parents,
and among pupils of poorly equipped public schools whose
(maths) teacher is male. However, once the interaction be-
tween gender and the three above regional characteristics
are included in the regressions, the correlation between fe-
male disadvantage, on the one hand, and parental education
and school characteristics, on the other hand, disappears. This
indicates that the broad societal environment not only dra-
matically inﬂuences female relative performance in maths, it
also takes precedence over factors more directly inﬂuenced
by policy such as teacher gender.
In cross-country regressions similar to those in Guiso
et al. (2008) and Fryer and Levitt (2010) formedium- to high-
incomecountries,weﬁnd conﬁrmation that the gender gap in
mathematics is strongly correlatedwith characteristics of the
societies inwhich childrengrowup.Higher gender equality in
termsof economicparticipationandopportunity, educational
attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment,
as measured by the Gender Gap Index is not correlated with
better female performance in maths relative to boys in Sub-
Saharan Africa, thus echoing the ﬁnding in Fryer and Levitt
(2010) for TIMMS countries. However, about half the cross-
country variation in the gender gap can be accounted for by
variation in the total fertility rate, and when national differ-
ences in fertility are controlled for, cross-country variation in
the gender gap is unrelated to differences in GDP per capita.
We put less weight on our cross-country regressions than on
our analysis of the micro data given that we have a sample
of only 19 countries and that the PASEC and SACMEQ tests
are different. But these estimates provide a useful point of
comparisonwith previous literature, and suggest that the so-
cietal inﬂuences, which matter in determining the extent of
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this external source is 0.91.the gender gap in the individual data, and which are corre-
lated with the regional share of adult women who have no
education, the regional share Muslim in the population, and
the regional total fertility rate, might have more to do with
cultural values than economic opportunities.
This analysis gives support to the idea that a substantial
share of the ubiquitous gender gap in maths performance
is not due simply to inherent, genetic differences between
genders per se, but that speciﬁc environmental factors are
required in order for any genetic difference that theremay be
to translate into sizeably lower average female performance
in maths. This gap therefore does not have to be accepted as
unavoidable.
There are two possible interpretations for these ﬁndings.
The ﬁrst one is that girls perform less well in maths tests
without having inferior mathematics knowledge due, e.g., to
a stereotype threat, and that this stereotype threat is stronger
in regions where traditional female roles are more pro-
nounced. The second explanation is that girls acquire fewer
mathematics skills in these regions. Lack of data prevents
us from disentangling these two mechanisms. Either way,
lower scores at mathematic cognitive tests are associated
with lower income. Although the countries and tests referred
to in the following studies are different to the ones consid-
ered here, estimates in Glewwe (1996) and Jolliffe (1998) for
Ghana, andMoll (1998) for SouthAfrica imply that an increase
by 0.1 sd in maths test scores is correlated with a 2–6.5% in-
crease in income. The magnitude of the gender gap observed
in our data may therefore lead to non-negligible gender dif-
ferences in income, especially in regions where the gap is
particularly wide. Our cross-country comparisons as well as
existing evidence of the gender gap in developed countries
suggest that the gap is unlikely to disappear with economic
growth alone.
Reduction in gender inequalities is not necessarily as pow-
erful a tool for economic development as sometimes argued,
but gender equality may be worth pursuing in its own right
(Duﬂo, 2012). What can policy makers interested in promot-
ing gender equality learn from our study? More research is
needed in order to test the causal effect of speciﬁc interven-
tions aimed at improving female performance in maths. But
the evidence provided in this paper suggests that one inter-
vention known to improve female enrolment in developing
countries, namely theprovisionof female teachers, is unlikely
to close the gap on its own, given that we show that girls do
not perform any better with a female teacher conditional on
living in regions with unfavourable characteristics. Further-
more, single-sex schooling is associated with a lower gender
gap in maths only in a subset of countries in our sample, and
the small numbers observed in such schools limit the gener-
ality of such an effect. Experimental evidence on the effect of
single-sex schooling on the gender gap would be welcome in
order to establish the extent to which this association can be
interpreted as causal.
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Appendix A
Fig. A1. Correlation between the gender gap in maths and the gross enrol-
ment ratio. Source: Authors’ calculations based on SACMEQ II, PASEC, and
UNESCO (2006) as described in Section 3.
Table A1
Comparison of primary education gross parity index between UNESCO and
SACMEQ/PASEC data sources.
Country Primary
education gross
parity index
from UNESCO
(2006)
Grade 5 (PASEC)
or Grade 6
(SACMEQ)
enrolment ratio
from surveys
used in the
analysis
SACMEQ
Botswana 1.00 1.04
Kenya 0.97 0.95
Lesotho 1.08 1.29
Malawi 0.95 0.91
Mauritius 1.00 0.93
Mozambique 0.74 0.62
Namibia 1.02 1.05
South Africa 0.98 1.05
Swaziland 0.95 1.06
United Republic of Tanzania 1.00 1.07
Uganda 0.92 0.78
Zambia 0.92 0.93
PASEC
Benin 0.77 0.65
Cameroon 0.85 0.77
Chad 0.64 0.55
Gabon 0.99 0.99
Guinea 0.81 0.79
Madagascar 0.96 1.20
Mauritania 0.98 1.02
Source: UNESCO (2006) and authors’ calculations based on SACMEQ and
PASEC data.
Note: The gross parity index from UNESCO (2006) is equal to the ratio of the
female GER over the male GER for all primary school grades. The coeﬃcient
of correlation between the enrolment ratio in our sample (taken in a single
year towards the end of primary schooling) and the enrolment ratios from
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Table A2
SACMEQ – individual country regressions: female coeﬃcients.
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Speciﬁcation No FE School FE (2) + age + individual pupil access to schooling inputs (3) + home environment
Botswana 0.091∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.029 0.021
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
No. of children 3321 3321 3321 3321
R2 0.003 0.004 0.058 0.121
Kenya −0.205∗∗∗ −0.227∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
No. of children 3296 3296 3279 3279
R2 0.012 0.022 0.086 0.111
Lesotho 0.013 0.009 −0.029 −0.031
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
No. of children 3144 3144 3144 3144
R2 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.047
Malawi −0.110∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
No. of Children 2,323 2,323 2,323 2,323
R2 0.012 0.009 0.030 0.048
Mauritius 0.121∗ 0.096∗ 0.036 0.063
(0.049) (0.043) (0.041) (0.039)
No. of children 2870 2870 2870 2870
R2 0.002 0.002 0.107 0.221
Mozambique −0.197∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
No. of children 3136 3136 2999 2999
R2 0.023 0.042 0.063 0.099
Namibia −0.066∗∗ −0.036∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
No. of children 4990 4990 4990 4990
R2 0.002 0.001 0.025 0.047
South Africa 0.089∗ 0.019 −0.021 −0.016
(0.038) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
No. of children 3135 3135 3113 3113
R2 0.002 0.000 0.029 0.075
Swaziland −0.033 −0.032 −0.086∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
No. of children 3138 3138 3138 3138
R2 0.001 0.001 0.036 0.051
Tanzania −0.312∗∗∗ −0.333∗∗∗ −0.352∗∗∗ −0.344∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
No. of children 2849 2849 2849 2849
R2 0.031 0.048 0.090 0.149
Uganda −0.114∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
No. of children 2619 2619 2619 2619
R2 0.003 0.020 0.059 0.081
Zambia −0.074∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
No. of children 2586 2586 2517 2517
R2 0.003 0.007 0.044 0.080
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PASEC data, as described in Section 3.
Notes: See notes under Table 4a.
Table A3
PASEC – individual country regressions: female coeﬃcients.
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Speciﬁcation No FE School FE (2) + age + individual
pupil access to
schooling inputs
(3) + home environment (4) no imputed values (4) + initial score
Benin −0.187∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.028)
No. children 1822 1822 1820 1761 1606 1761
R2 0.010 0.025 0.027 0.044 0.049 0.241
(continued on next page)
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Table A3 (continued)
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Speciﬁcation No FE School FE (2) + age + individual
pupil access to
schooling inputs
(3) + home environment (4) no imputed values (4) + initial score
Cameroon −0.018 −0.023 −0.025 −0.025 −0.029 0.032
(0.044) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.040) (0.037)
No. children 1735 1735 1723 1621 1480 1621
R2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.018 0.080
Chad −0.027 −0.109∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗ −0.098∗∗ −0.019
(0.048) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.046) (0.039)
No. children 1237 1237 1205 1046 915 1046
R2 0.000 0.009 0.012 0.033 0.038 0.173
Gabon −0.089∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.046
(0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.041) (0.033)
No. children 1491 1491 1465 1393 1191 1393
R2 0.004 0.009 0.017 0.032 0.046 0.248
Guinea −0.194∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026)
No. children 2173 2173 2148 2036 1863 2036
R2 0.012 0.017 0.019 0.026 0.030 0.193
Madagascar −0.058 −0.071∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗
(0.040) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.029)
No. children 1964 1964 1930 1857 1721 1857
R2 0.001 0.003 0.011 0.021 0.026 0.273
Mauritania 0.011 −0.117∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.059∗
(0.045) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.037) (0.032)
No. children 1482 1482 1470 1430 1279 1430
R2 0.000 0.010 0.019 0.029 0.031 0.217
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PASEC data, as described in Section 3.
Notes: See notes under Table 4b.
Table A4
Details of data sources.
Regional variables used
in individual-level
Survey/country Variables used in cross-country regressions regressions
Maternal Primary gross
School GDP National GGI Share Muslim – year mortality enrolment ratio DHS
survey year TFR year year varies year year year
SACMEQ
Botswana 2000 2000 2000 2007 Kettani (2009) 2010 1999 n/a
Kenya 2000 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 1999 1998
Lesotho 2000 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 1999 2004
Malawi 2002 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 1999 2000
Mauritius 2001 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 1999 n/a
Mozambique 2000 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 1999 1997
Namibia 2000 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 1999 2000
South Africa 2000 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 1999 1998
Swaziland 2000 2000 2000 n/a CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 1999 2006/2007
Tanzania 2000 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 1999 1999
Uganda 2000 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 1999 2000/2001
Zambia 2000 2000 2000 2007 Kettani (2009) 2010 1999 2001/2002
PASEC
Benin 2004/2005 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 2004 2006
Cameroon 2004/2005 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 2004 2004
Chad 2003/2004 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 2004 2004
Gabon 2005/2006 2000 2000 n/a CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 2004 2000
Guinea 2003/2004 2000 2000 n/a CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 2004 2005
Madagascar 2004/2005 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 2004 2003/2004
Mauritania 2003/2004 2000 2000 2007 CIA Factbook (2010a) 2010 2004 2003
Notes:
(1) GGI: National Gender Gap Indexes data are only available from 2006 onwards (Haussmann et al., 2007).We use the 2007 data as it includes one
additional country (Mozambique).
(2) The 2003 Mauritania DHS is not in the public domain. For this country, the variables used in the analysis are therefore taken from the corresponding
DHS report (Isselmou, 2004) rather than calculated from the microdata.
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